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ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING WHEN A LAWYER
LEAVES A FIRM: RESTRICTIONS
ON PRACTICE
Committee on Professional Responsibility, Association of
the Bar of the City of New York t
I. Introduction
It has long been the rule that covenants not to compete do not have
an appropriate place in the practice of law.' For over three decades,
the ethical prohibition against restrictive covenants has been justified
on public policy grounds as preventing interference with the right of
clients to an attorney of their choice. However, as discussed below,
the client choice basis of the rule is overstated, as in most cases a
client will be able to retain a lawyer of his or her choice whether or
not the lawyer is subject to a partnership agreement restricting her
movement to another firm. Instead, the primary effect of the rule is
the preservation of the attorney's autonomy by allowing her the free-
dom to move from one place of employment to another. In particu-
lar, the rule serves the salutary purpose of protecting attorneys,
particularly newer members of the bar, from bargaining away their
right to open their own office or move to another firm after they end
an association with a legal employer. The exception to this rule oc-
curs where the firm imposes a condition that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law as a prerequisite to the payment of retirement
benefits.2
The modern growth of large law firms with shifting compositions of
partners and associates, the portable nature of law practices and client
lists, and the widespread professional acceptability of attorney trans-
fers between competing law firms in the same geographic area, have
t April 1993. The members of the Committee at the time this report was written
are listed in Appendix A.
1. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-108(A) provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employ-
ment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to prac-
tice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except
as a condition to payment of retirement benefits.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (1992) [hereinafter N.Y. CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. Rule 5.6(a) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT (1983) has adopted the same rule in substantially the same terms.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1983); N.Y. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, DR 2-108(A).
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all focused attention on the ethical issues arising out of covenants not
to compete. In addition, recent economic downturns have caused
some firms to take advantage of contractual provisions providing for
reduced payments to withdrawing partners who continue to practice
law in the geographic area where their firm is located. Other issues
are created by the rule's explicit approval of practice restrictions in
the context of retirement (the so-called "retirement benefits excep-
tion") and the difficulties created when an attorney elects to end his
retirement and return to the practice of law. The courts and the ethi-
cal rules are faced with the daunting prospect of resolving the central
tension between the interest of the law firm in survival and the interest
of the departing lawyer in mobility.
This Report will discuss the various issues arising out of covenants
not to compete, and will analyze how the courts and ethics rules have
sought to resolve these conflicting interests.
II. The Cohen Case
Covenants restricting an attorney from practicing in a specific geo-
graphic area for a fixed period of years after leaving his employment
have uniformly been deemed improper. The ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility has stated:
[A] general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving
the employment, from practicing in the community for a stated
period, appears to this Committee to be an unwarranted restriction
on the right of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and incon-
sistent with our professional status. Accordingly, the Committee is
of the opinion it would be improper for the employing lawyer to
require the covenant and likewise for the employed lawyer to agree
to it.
3
New York ethical opinions are in accord.4
In Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord,5 the New York Court of Appeals
considered the propriety of a provision in a law firm partnership
agreement that imposed an economic penalty on a departing partner
who "continues to practice law in any state or other jurisdiction in
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 300 (1961)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 300]. Unlike most recent pronouncements of the public policy
underlying restrictions against covenants not to compete, ABA Opinion 300 candidly
based its opposition to such covenants on the need to preserve the professional autonomy
of the lawyer.
4. See N.Y. State B. Ass'n, Op. 129 (1970); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 622 (1973); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 611 (1972).
5. 75 N.Y.2d 95 (1989).
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which the Partnership maintains an office or any contiguous jurisdic-
tion."6 The partnership agreement contained a common provision
protecting against automatic dissolution upon the withdrawal of a
partner and provided a formula pay-out over a three-year period to a
withdrawing partner, representing a share of unpaid fees and fees for
services not yet billed at the time of departure.
The partnership agreement further contained a forfeiture-for-com-
petition clause, which stated as follows:
Notwithstanding anything in this Article ... to the contrary, if a
Partner withdraws from the Partnership and without the prior
written consent of the Executive Committee continues to practice
law in any state or other jurisdiction in which the Partnership
maintains an office or any contiguous jurisdiction, either as a law-
yer in private practice or as a counsel employed by a business firm,
he shall have no further interest in and there shall be paid to him
no proportion of the net profits of the Partnership collected there-
after, whether for services rendered before or after his withdrawal.
There shall be paid to him only his withdrawable credit balance on
the books of the Partnership at the date of his withdrawal, together
with the amount of his capital account, and the Partnership shall
have no further obligation to him.7
In Cohen, the law firm argued that Cohen had forfeited his depar-
ture compensation when he withdrew from Lord, Day & Lord
("LD&L") to become a partner in another large New York City law
firm and therefore refused to pay him his share of current earnings.
Cohen sued LD&L to recover his departure compensation, and
LD&L asserted the forfeiture-for-competition clause as a defense.
The trial court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held the
clause unenforceable as violative of DR 2-108(A). The Appellate Di-
vision, First Department reversed, stating that the clause was valid as
a "financial disincentive" to competition that did not prevent, and
had not prevented Cohen from practicing law in New York or in any
other jurisdiction.8
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
We hold that while the provision in question does not expressly or
completely prohibit a withdrawing partner from engaging in the
practice of law, the significant monetary penalty it exacts, if the
withdrawing partner practices competitively with the former firm,
6. Id. at 97.
7. Id.
8. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 534 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 75
N.Y.2d 95 (1989).
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constitutes an impermissible restriction on the practice of law. The
forfeiture-for-competition provision would functionally and realis-
tically discourage and foreclose a withdrawing partner from serv-
ing clients who might wish to continue to be represented by the
withdrawing lawyer and would thus interfere with the client's
choice of counsel.9
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited with approval the prior
ethical opinions of the American Bar Association and the New York
County Lawyers Association that were codified by DR 2-108(A).
The Court of Appeals rejected LD&L's contentions that DR 2-
108(A) condemns only blanket prohibitions on a lawyer's practice of
law in a community and that a mere economic disincentive, such as
its forfeiture-for-competition clause, would not prevent Cohen or any-
one else from practicing law. In support of its holding, the court cited
Gray v. Martin,10 in which the Oregon Court of Appeals invalidated a
partnership agreement that required a forfeiture of a percentage of the
firm's future profits if the withdrawing attorney practiced in a desig-
nated three-county area. In Gray, the law firm had argued unsuccess-
fully that the covenant did not "restrict" the withdrawing lawyer's
right to practice because that lawyer could still practice in the area by
accepting the consequences-i.e., by forfeiting benefits.
The Cohen court also rejected LD&L's contention that the retire-
ment benefits exception in DR 2-108(A) authorized a forfeiture of
previously earned but uncollected departure compensation. First, the
court noted that retirement benefits were set forth in a separate provi-
sion of the LD&L partnership agreement, which expressly excluded
withdrawing partners and referred them back to the forfeiture-for-
competition provision. Second, the court pointed out that, unlike re-
tirement benefits, which extended at least to the death of the retiring
partner and even continued to the partner's surviving spouse under
certain circumstances, all departure payments were to be made within
the three years following withdrawal.
LD&L also raised a public policy argument that firms are justified
in enforcing a forfeiture of departure compensation provision because
withdrawing partners are likely to hurt a firm's future profits by tak-
ing clients of the firm. The court rejected this argument and stated
that
[w]hile a law firm has a legitimate interest in its own survival and
economic well-being and in maintaining its clients, it cannot pro-
tect those interests by contracting for forfeiture of earned revenues
9. Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98.
10. 663 P.2d 1285 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
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during the withdrawing partner's active tenure and participation
by, in effect, restricting the choices of the clients to retain and con-
tinue the withdrawing member as counsel.'"
Thus, as to previously earned revenues, the interest in law firm sur-
vival was found to be outweighed by the departing lawyer's interest in
personal autonomy and freedom of movement.
The court in Cohen was careful to state that its holding was pre-
mised on Cohen's entitlement to earn uncollected fees accrued during
his tenure as a partner of the firm, not to fees generated in the future.
Thus, the court correctly, in the Committee's view, pointed out that
its decision would not result in a windfall to the withdrawing partner.
Rather, the court stated, its decision would ensure only that the de-
parting partner did not forfeit earned income.
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court elaborated on the limita-
tions expressed in Cohen by stating that, in computing the value of a
departing lawyer's interest in a firm, the value contributed can be off-
set "by the decrease in the firm's value their departure causes. "12
Thus, the highest courts of both New York and New Jersey have
sought to balance the interest in firm survival and the interest in free-
dom of movement in the following manner: the partnership may not
deprive the departing lawyer of rightfully earned income or the value
of their capital accounts, but the firm may offset for loss of good will
and may retain future income.
Judge Hancock and Chief Judge Wachtler dissented in Cohen in
separate opinions. Judge Hancock essentially agreed with the Appel-
late Division's conclusion that the clause in question constituted a
reasonable contractual term covering the withdrawal of a partner
within the province of competent contracting parties.' 3 Moreover,
the dissent argued that even assuming the clause conflicted with DR
2-108(A), such conflict did not require the invalidation of the partner-
ship agreement as contrary to New York public policy.' 4 In short,
Judge Hancock was unwilling to give a disciplinary rule the force of
law in a civil action.' 5 Reminding the majority that the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is characterized as "an inspirational guide to
the members of the professions and as a basis for disciplinary action,"
the Hancock dissent was critical of using DR 2-108(A) in a civil ac-
11. Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 101.
12. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d .142 (N.J. 1992).
13. See Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 102-103 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 105.
15. Id. at 108.
1993]
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tion to impose or avoid contractual liability.' 6
Chief Judge Wachtler concurred in the Hancock dissent but also
found that the withdrawal clause in question fell squarely within the
"retirement benefits" exception to DR 2-108(A).' 7 The fact that the
plaintiff in the Cohen case was not retiring from the practice of law
did not, in Chief Judge Wachtler's view, mean that the benefits he
claimed could not be considered retirement benefits; it meant instead
that, under the agreement, his failure to retire precluded him from
receiving the benefits. Otherwise, the retirement benefits exception
could be eviscerated simply by the departing partner's refusal to
retire. 18
III. The Rationale of DR 2-108(A)
A. Protecting the Client's Choice of Counsel
The Committee believes that the Cohen court correctly interpreted
the language of DR 2-108(A). However, the Cohen court, in search-
ing for a policy justification for the rule, relied too heavily on the need
to protect the client's choice of counsel. In the majority of cases, a
partnership agreement that penalizes an attorney's movement from
one firm to another does not in fact affect a client's decision to retain a
particular lawyer. Assuming that a financial penalty against competi-
tion induced a lawyer to remain at his firm, clients could continue to
retain that lawyer's services. Alternatively, if the lawyer chose to in-
cur the financial penalty and compete with his former firm, clients
could still retain that same lawyer. Thus, under either circumstance,
clients will be able to obtain the counsel of their choice-they are
ordinarily unaffected by the financial relationship between the lawyer
and the firm.
Cases may exist where the client is dissatisfied with the firm, but
not the lawyer, and the lawyer's inability to move from the firm could
impair the client's right to choose that particular lawyer. However,
there may be other cases where the client is satisfied with both the
firm and the lawyer, and the client does not want the lawyer to leave
the firm. In such cases, the lawyer's withdrawal from the firm would
16. See id. (quoting Code of Professional Responsibility Preliminary Statement, 29
N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS app. at 354-55 (McKinney 1992)); cf Comm. on Professional Re-
sponsibility, Suppressing Evidence Obtained in Violation of DR 7-104: If Hammad Is
Right, Is the Civil Law Wrong?, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 431 (1992) (noting that
courts rarely use suppression as a remedy for an ethical violation because "ethical
breaches are properly remedied by professional sanctions against the offending
attorney").
17. Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 1 1 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
[Vol. XX
WHEN A LAWYER LEAVES A FIRM
also be damaging to the client's freedom to choose. Yet no one in
these situations has argued that a restrictive covenant is ethical be-
cause it preserves the client's choice to retain the attorney and the
firm together. Thus, it is apparent that the ethical status of a restric-
tive covenant is ordinarily independent of the client's right to counsel
of choice. At best this is a subsidiary interest behind DR 2-108(A).
B. Promoting Attorney Mobility
The rule can be defended on a more persuasive ground: absent DR
2-108(A), a lawyer's ability to move between firms would be curtailed
because the lawyer would sustain a financial penalty in so doing. The
promotion of attorney mobility is the unstated-but real-purpose of
the rule. The Committee believes strongly that so long as DR 2-
108(A) remains extant, it ought to be enforced.
IV. Post-Cohen Litigation
The holding in Cohen was relied on by the Appellate Division, First
Department in Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl."9 The
Denburg court invalidated a provision in a partnership agreement that
required any partner who withdrew from the firm before a fixed date,
and continued to practice law, to pay the firm an amount equal to
twelve and one-half percent of the partner's profits during the ten
years preceding the departure. This penalty was to be offset against
the amounts in the withdrawing partner's capital account. Withdraw-
ing partners who did not continue to practice law were entitled to
receive all of their capital account, without interest, five years follow-
ing their withdrawal.
The firm contended that when it negotiated a $4.5 million loan in
1983 to finance its move into new quarters, the partners agreed to stay
together for five years to share the cost of the investment, and that
those who left the firm during that period would contribute the fore-
going financial penalty to the remaining partners. The Appellate Di-
vision, concluding that the explanation was "at best, only a partial
account of the provision's purpose," stated:
[I]t is evident that [the provision's] principal function was to pre-
vent withdrawing partners from competing with their former firm.
The provision, after all, exacts a penalty only from those with-
drawn partners who continue to practice law privately, and there-
19. 586 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1992). The New York Court of Appeals is sched-
uled to hear arguments in the Deburg case in Octover, 1993. Cases on State Court of
Appeals's Docket, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 2.
1993]
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fore, potentially in competition with the firm, and exempts from
the penalty only those who ... do not in their new situations con-
tinue to serve their former firm's clients.20
In an unsigned memorandum decision, the court reversed the deci-
sion of the trial judge and granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment declaring the penalty portion of the partnership agreement
invalid as a violation of DR 2-108. The court stated that the para-
graph in question "is no less a forfeiture-for-competition provision
than the provision at issue in Cohen. ' '21
The decision in Denburg indicates that New York courts are likely
to vigorously enforce DR 2-108(A)'s proscription against covenants
not to compete. While that approach is proper in view of the Cohen
holding, as stated above, the Committee believes that DR 2-108(A)
does not fulfill its supposed purpose of allowing clients access to the
attorney of their choice. Nonetheless, the Committee believes that the
Cohen and Denburg courts struck an appropriate balance between law
firm survival and an individual lawyer's autonomy. Although the
Committee recognizes that the withdrawal of one or more partners
with substantial business can severely damage a firm or lead to its
dissolution, the Committee is equally concerned that law firms may
impose draconian restrictive covenants on lawyers who are in an une-
qual bargaining position vis-a-vis the firm, especially young lawyers.
Therefore, the Committee concludes that a departing attorney should
be permitted to withdraw his or her rightful share of earnings, while
at the same time the law firm should be entitled to all future earnings
as well as an adjustment of a withdrawing partner's equity interest to
account for the effect of the loss of that partner on the firm's good
will. This reflects the balance struck by Cohen and its progeny.
V. The Scope of the Retirement Benefits Exception
Although in Cohen the defendant law firm's efforts to have its for-
feiture-for-competition provision read as a "retirement benefits" pro-
vision under DR 2-108(A) did not succeed, the Committee anticipates
that such efforts will continue as law firms attempt to draft these
clauses to bring them within the "retirement benefits" exception. The
Committee believes strongly that so long as DR 2-108(A) remains in
20. Id. at 109.
21. Id. The court also refused to give effect to the plaintiff's waiver of an accounting
"in circumstances such as those at bar in which it has been established that the partner-
ship agreement has been contravened to the plaintiff's detriment and there are, as a re-
sult, sums, as yet unascertained, owing from the defendant firm to the plaintiff." Id. at
110.
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existence it should be respected in the drafting and enforcement of
law firm partnership agreements. Thus, the retirement benefits excep-
tion should apply only if the benefits are clearly allocated for retire-
ment purposes. If that is the case, the payment of such benefits may
properly be made contingent upon retirement by the departing
lawyer.
The retirement benefits exception cannot apply where the funds to
be paid are those to which a departing lawyer is entitled, such as a
share of undistributed earned income, or a contribution to capital.
Under the plain terms of DR 2-108(A), as well as the explicit holding
in Cohen, a firm cannot condition such payments on the departing
lawyer's agreement not to compete. It also is clear that the retirement
benefits exception does not allow the firm to condition payments it
would otherwise be required to make pursuant to an employee benefit
plan. The payout requirements of employee benefit plans and retire-
ment plans are governed by. federal law, which is preemptive.
Rather, the retirement benefits exception applies only if the firm
decides to make a pay-out to retiring attorneys, of monies to which
they are not otherwise entitled (e.g. future earnings), in order to assist
them in their retirement. It is only in this limited situation that it
makes sense to allow the firm to condition these payments on the law-
yer's decision to remain retired.
The lower court's decision in Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy22 provides an example of a reasoned application of the retire-
ment benefits exception. One of the clauses in the partnership agree-
ment in Hackett contained a substantial monetary penalty if a
withdrawing partner failed to retire from the practice of law.23 The
other provision conditioned departure payments on a withdrawing
partner not earning more than $100,000 per year after withdrawal,
thereby effectively making payments unavailable to withdrawing part-
ners who obtained employment in competing firms.24 The plaintiff, a
former partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy who left the
firm to join a competing firm in New York City, sought a permanent
stay of arbitration with respect to the Milbank, Tweed partnership
agreement on the ground that provisions of the agreement violated
DR 2-108(A).25
22. See 581 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div.), aff'd, 80 N.Y.2d 870 (1992). Justice Lobis, the
author of the Hackett opinion in the Supreme Court, is a member of the Committee on
Professional Responsibility but took no part in the writing of this Report.
23. Id.
24. Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, No. 10341/91, 1991 WL 292576,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1991).
25. Id. at *1.
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The lower court held that the provisions at issue violated DR 2-
108(A). 26 Therefore, the court, relying on a public policy exception to
arbitration, granted a stay of arbitration. 27 The court reasoned that
the first clause at issue penalized a withdrawing partner by making a
substantial payment unavailable if he or she engaged in competition
with the firm after leaving the partnership, and that although the term
"retirement" was used in the provision, "the provision is unrelated to
true retirement benefits making the retirement exemption for the rule
unavailable. 28
The lower court further stated that the other clause at issue was a
more creative attempt at avoiding DR 2-108(A) by conditioning pay-
ments on a withdrawing partner not earning more than a fixed
amount per year.29 However, the court concluded that this clause
also had the effect of a forfeiture-for-competition provision, because in
reality it would apply against all withdrawing partners. The clause
was thereby invalid under Cohen. 30 The court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a permanent stay of arbitration. The Appellate Division,
First Department affirmed.3'
In a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals, by a vote of 5-0,
reversed, holding that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration
in view of "the broad arbitration clause" in the partnership agree-
ment. The court reasoned that Hackett's contention "that an arbitra-
tor's award denying him benefits would be contrary to public policy is
insufficient to preemptively stay arbitration and may be addressed
subsequently on a motion to vacate or confirm the award, if such an
award is in fact made."'3 2 It must be recognized, however, that the
Court of Appeals did not reject the lower court's reasoning on the
retirement benefits exception; rather, it decided the case on proce-
dural grounds.
A tension exists between the rationale of DR 2-108(A) and the "re-
tirement benefits" exception. Clearly, any restriction on future prac-
tice as a condition of retirement benefits constitutes an impediment on
future clients' access to the attorney of their choice and a financial
restraint on the attorney who might wish to continue in practice but
can only do so by foregoing retirement benefits. On the other hand, if
the firm has in fact agreed to pay benefits to retiring partners to which
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Hackett, 1991 WL 292576, at *2.
30. Id.
31. 581 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1992).
32. 80 N.Y.2d at 870, 871 (1992) (citations omitted).
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they would not otherwise be entitled, it is not unfair to condition the
benefit on actual retirement. Without a retirement benefits exception,
unfairness would result where departing partners continue in practice
and simultaneously obtain benefits intended for retiring partners. If
attorneys could take the money earmarked for retiring partners and
then continue in practice, the firm would hardly have an incentive to
provide financial assistance to retiring partners.
As Professors Hazard and Hodes state, the retirement benefits ex-
ception can be justified so long as it is strictly construed:
[Under the retirement benefits exception], when a lawyer is retiring
or winding up his affairs with a firm he may be required to agree to
"stay retired" as a condition of obtaining pay-outs from future
earnings of the firm. To the extent that there is an adverse impact
on the potential availability of lawyers who retire but then wish to
practice again, or lawyers who "retire" from one firm in order to
relocate, such agreements would appear to limit the availability of
active lawyers and correspondingly reduce client choice. Such
conditions should be deemed permissible only where the firm is
actually paying retirement benefits to its former partner or
associate.33
A problem has arisen where a retired partner receiving retirement
benefits from his former firm decides to resume the practice of law.
For example, in Graubard Mollen Horowitz Pomeranz & Shapiro v.
Moskovitz, 34 the plaintiff law firm had approved a series of retirement
agreements that provided for a "phase-down" of the senior partners.
These agreements included the return of capital during the "phase-
down" period and the payment of retirement benefits during a subse-
quent five-year period.35 The principal defendant, during the second
year of the five-year retirement period, joined a competing New York
City law firm and brought several important clients to his new firm.
When he returned to practice, he notified the firm that he no longer
wished to receive retirement benefits. 36 The former law firm sued for
breach of contract, among other things, and contended that DR 2-
108(A) did not preclude enforcement of the retirement agreements
and the restriction of practice provided therein.37 It was clear, as the
court recognized, that the agreements in question concerned retire-
ment and payment of monies to which departing attorneys were not
33. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 5.6:201 (2d ed. 1990).
34. 565 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
35. Id. at 673-74.
36. See id. at 674-75.
37. Id. at 674.
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otherwise entitled.3 a Moreover, unlike the partnership agreement in
Cohen, these agreements did not contain separate retirement and
withdrawal provisions. Thus, the retirement benefits exception to DR
2-108(A) was implicated, and the court assumed that the firm could
properly condition the payment of benefits on the departing partner's
actual retirement.
However, the departing lawyer in Graubard contended that the re-
striction on practice was applicable only so long as he continued to
claim retirement benefits. He argued that once he renounced the ben-
efits, he was no longer restricted from practicing. The firm argued to
the contrary that, having accepted retirement benefits, the departing
lawyer was barred from leaving the firm to do anything other than
retire.39
The court held that the lawyer's abandonment of any continued
claim to retirement benefits entitled him to properly resume the prac-
tice of law and to represent clients of the former firm.4° Justice
Harold Baer, Jr. based his conclusion upon the fact that DR 2-108(A)
permits, as a "condition" to the payment of retirement benefits, an
otherwise prohibited restriction upon the right to practice. The court
stated: "The word 'condition' suggests that the restriction is linked to
the benefits; therefore, if the partner abandons his right to these bene-
fits, the restriction ceases to be proper."' 4 ' He concluded that the re-
tirement benefits exception "ought to be narrowly read" and that
while a firm may condition retirement benefits on actual retirement,
the departing lawyer may decide to forego the benefits and continue in
practice.4 2
The court in Graubard did not consider the question of whether the
departing lawyer should be required to restore the retirement benefits
that had been paid to him by the firm during the time in which he had
in fact, though temporarily, retired from the practice of law. This
Committee believes that the lawyer who retires temporarily should
not be required to pay back the retirement benefits received during the
time in which the lawyer was actually retired. Retirement benefits are
installment payments by a law firm to financially assist the departing
attorney who has left the practice of law. The crucial and only rele-
vant point in time at which to evaluate the payments is the time at
which the payments are made. The departed lawyer's situation at the
38. Id. at 675.
39. Graubard Mollen Horowitz Pomeranz & Shapiro, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 676.
42. Id.
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time of payment is not affected by a subsequent decision to return to
the practice of law. Also, the Committee believes that a payback re-
quirement would unfairly penalize a lawyer who has legitimate sec-
ond thoughts about retirement. While the firm can condition
retirement benefits on a lawyer's decision to remain retired, it does
not follow that the firm can use a payback requirement as a coercive
device to all but force an attorney to remain retired.
The Committee agrees with the view of the courts that a narrow
construction of the retirement benefits exception reflects a proper bal-
ance of the interests of the firm and the departing attorney. Clearly, it
makes no sense to promulgate an exception which swallows the rule
by allowing a restriction of practice whenever the partnership agree-
ment refers in some way to "retirement." Instead there must be a
clear indication that the firm has adopted a plan to benefit withdraw-
ing partners because they are retiring, by providing payments to
which the attorneys are not otherwise entitled. If that is the case, it is
fair, reasonable, and ethical to limit the benefits to those who actually
retire. Thus, as set out in Graubard, restrictions on an attorney's
right to practice should be permissible where the firm is actually pay-
ing retirement benefits to its former partner or lawyer-employee.4"
VI. Conclusion
The Committee believes that Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, in its
interpretation of DR 2-108(A), properly balances the law firm's inter-
est in survival with the individual lawyer's interest in personal auton-
omy and freedom of movement. The Committee also contends that
the retirement benefits exception in DR 2-108(A) should be construed
narrowly.
DR 2-108(A) does not generally serve the purpose for which it was
supposedly designed-to allow clients unfettered access to attorneys
of their choice. To the extent that it serves that purpose, it is at best a
subsidiary consideration that is insufficient to justify the threat to law
firm survival that DR 2-108(A) can impose. The major justification
for the rule is to promote a lawyer's personal autonomy by allowing
the lawyer some freedom of movement. The rule serves the important
purpose of preventing law firms from imposing covenants not to com-
pete on lawyers who may be in unequal bargaining positions vis-a-vis
the firms. This interest is an important one and, thus, often outweighs
the law firm's interest in survival. Accordingly, the Committee be-
lieves that the balance struck by DR 2-108(A) is sound.
43. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 33, § 5.6:201.
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